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Abstract 
 
In the past decade there has been a series of conflicting 
arbitration awards regarding the interpretation of the Most-
Favoured-Nation standard and if it can be extended to dispute 
settlement procedure. The analysis suggests that there is an 
imperative difference of the outcomes between a teleogical 
interpretation of MFN treatment and an objective interpretation 
of the respective MFN clauses. While there are many aspects to 
consider regarding an expansion of the MFN scope, it is the 
contention of this thesis that in the context of procedural 
predictability and article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, that the benefits of a teleogical interpretation 
against an extension of the MFN standard into procedural 
provisions outweighs the benefits of an objective allowing an 
extensive interpretation. Furthermore, an analogy to how the 
MFN clause is interpreted in international trade law suggests 
that it would not be reasonable to expect that an MFN clause 
should be extended to dispute settlement provisions if the clause 
does not explicitly state that it does extend to such provisions. 
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Abbreviations 
BIT – Bilateral Investment Treaty 
DSU – Understanding on Rules and Procedure Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes 
EU – European Union 
FET – Fair and Equitable Treatment  
GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  
GATS – General Agreement on Trade in Services 
ICJ – International Court of Justice 
ICSID – International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
IIA – International Investment Agreement 
ILC – International Law Commission  
NT – National Treatment 
MAI – Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
MFN – Most Favoured Nation 
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
VCLT – The 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 
TRIPS - Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment standard is a core element of modern 
BIT’s.1 Like many standards of investment protection offered under BIT’s, it is 
designed to avoid discrimination.2 The objective is simply put to provide a 
mechanism to ensure that the relevant parties do not treat each other less favourable 
than the treatment offer by them to third parties.  
 
The increase of investments disputes settled by international arbitration in the last ten 
to fifteen years has had a strong influence on the meaning of substantive standards 
offered by Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT’s). From the practice it can be noted 
that some standards have evolved to gain in importance while others have diminished. 
Some standards have grown in complexity, appearing to interact with others while 
some have shown to have gained or proved an autonomous nature.3 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Dolzer, Rudolf; Schreuer, Christoph; 2008; Principles of International Investment Law; page 186. 
2 Such as the National Treatment (NT) standard and the Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) standard. 
3 See: Schreuer, Christoph; 2007; Standards of Investment Protection; page 1-8, for a good digest of 
the evolution of BIT standards. 
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Up to a decade ago the academic debate concerning MFN clauses in international 
investment arbitration largely centred on its substantive application.4 The legal 
practice surrounding formulations, violations or breaches of MFN clauses was not 
controversial5 and the debate mainly constituted of discussions concerning host state 
limitations in investment policy formation and definitions of investment. 
 
However, since the year 2000 there has been a shift in the discussion, starting with the 
decision of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
arbitration court in the case of Maffezini versus Spain.6 In it, it was found that the 
function of the standard could be extended far further than what had been conceivable 
before. One interesting aspect of this decision is that the arbitrary tribunal went 
against the general norm, which at the time had a very restrictive interpretation of 
MFN treatment in respect to importing substantive provisions from other treaties, 
particularly when the provision was absent from the original treaty and altered the 
specifically negotiated application scope of the treaty.7 
 
With the finding of the arbitration tribunal, the scope of the MFN standard appeared 
to have evolved from concerning strictly substantive interactions, to reaching into the 
procedure of international dispute settlement. Since the Maffezini judgement, a 
number of cases have dealt with the relationship between international arbitration 
procedure and the scope of the MFN standard and the results are inconclusive. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Banifatemi, Yas; 2009; The Emerging Jurisprudence on the Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in 
Investment Arbitration; page 242. 
5 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; 2010; Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment; 
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II; page XIV.	  
6 Stern, Brigitte; 2011; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17); 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion; page 2. 
7 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; 2010; Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment; 
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II; page XV. 
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reasons for the conflicting outcomes are many, complex and debated. Suffice to say, 
the contradictory verdicts seems to point to a lack of a defined stare decisis.8 
 
The question of whether the MFN clause can be extended to procedural provisions 
has now crystallized into three schools, where one is saying yes it can, one is saying 
no it cannot and a third is saying that it is impossible to say.9 With this development, 
it is feasible to perceive that the possibility to predict with any certitude what 
obligations a contracting party takes on when incorporating the MFN standard in an 
IIA, has decreased substantially within the field of international investment law.  
 
At the same time, the field has experienced a 57 per cent increase of treaty-based 
investor-state dispute settlement in five years.10 In the end of 2009 States had 
concluded 5,939 IIA’s and during the same year, international arbitration had 
rendered decisions in favour of the claimant producing almost 170 million US dollar 
in damages.11 
 
It is the contention of this thesis that this development12 is not desirable and that 
judicial predictability is an important aspect of international investment law. In the 
context of arbitration, both States and investors would have reason for concern when 
they see the same argument succeed one day and fail the next.13 For investors, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For the purpose of this thesis the term Stare Decisis is defined as the legal principle of determining 
points in litigation according to precedent.	  
9 Douglas, Zachary; 2011; The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation Off the 
Rails; page 98. 
 
10 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; Latest Developments in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement; IIA ISSUES NOT No. 1 (2010); UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3; page 2. 
11 Idem. Page 11. 
12 Meaning the development of IIA expansion in combination with obligations uncertainty.  
13 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; Latest Developments in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement; IIA ISSUES NOT No. 1 (2010); UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3; page 6. 
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legal uncertainty creates an inability to assess accurately commercial risks14, where as 
States may experience inability to exercise their legislative and regulatory powers 
without being exposed to litigation risks.15 
 
To remedy the uncertainty about the how to interpret the MFN standard in IIA’s, this 
paper proposes that one have to investigate the teleogical meaning of the standard. 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the MFN standard is an explicit obligation and 
therefore has a precise scope of application, which either incorporates procedural 
provisions or does not . It is also the hypothesis of this paper that parties to a treaty are 
aware of this and have this intention when drafting an agreement. Indeed, the very 
notion of a MFN “standard” seems to point to such a conclusion.  
 
1.1. Aim and Research Questions  
With this as a point of departure I seek to answer four principal questions: 
• Can the standard of Most-Favoured-Nation treatment be applied to 
international investment arbitration procedural provisions? 
• Does an extension to procedural provisions defeat the object and purpose of 
the MFN standard? 
• Where does the point of litigation truly lie according to the precedence? 
• Should a tribunal use presentence to substantiate the point of litigation? 
 
I believe that these questions need answers in order for parties of IIA’s to predict the 
consequences of the obligations that the MFN standard brings with it. Even though 
the case sources are not in large numbers the aim of this thesis is still to give a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This brings with it difficulties to know what type of political risk insurance to purchase for instance.  
15 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Research Note: Recent Developments in 
International Investment Agreements, UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/1 at 15 (Aug. 30, 2005) , page 15. 
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comprehensive understanding of the application of the MFN standard to dispute 
resolution, through qualitative analysis of the issue at hand. 
 
1.2. Structure 
The thesis is divided in three distinct parts. The first part seeks to provide a good 
understanding for the meaning of the standard ascertained from an historical 
background. 
Part two then applies the standard in the context of the arbitration tribunal’s decisions 
in order to investigate the reason for the conflicting outcomes. 
Part three concludes the findings and establishes a final statement for the benefit of 
this discussion. 
 
1.3. Methodology and Method 
To find the answer to the stated questions and validation of the hypothesis this thesis 
embraces a legal positivist approach. What I mean by that is that in the international 
legal system, the fundamental nature and structure of international law can be derived 
from a hierarchy of norms. Through a hierarchy of norms one can differentiate 
between norms that are legally binding and norms that are not. When searching for 
affirmation of a legally tenable interpretation I will use the hierarchy of legal sources 
codified under article 38 of The Statute of the International Court of Justice. It 
establishes that the sources of international law are: 
 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings 
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of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law.16 
 
By addressing a hierarchy of norms I argue that there is a need to focus on process of 
legal norms in order to ascertain the correct interpretation of a rule. To do this I will 
be analysing the origin and practice of the MFN standard through the lens of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
 
It is widely recognized that the use of other disciplines such as economics, history, 
political science, feminism and psychology as aids to legal research holds both 
relevance and merit.17 However for the benefit of the analysis, the method of this 
paper follows traditional legal doctrinal criticism. 
 
I seek to deduce the true ratio decidendi of an outcome and what factual consideration 
influenced the decision. I further look at: 
• If there is an implication overruling a preceding decision. 
• If the outcome is truly in line with established authority. 
• If the reasoning is subjected to criticism in formal, deductive or inductive 
logical terms.18 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Statute of the International Court of Justice Article 38(1). 
17 McConville, Mike; 2007; Research Methods for Law; page 5. 
18 Idem. Page 162.	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Within traditional legal doctrinal criticism there are three distinct interpretation 
models. These are the core analytical tools for this thesis. 
• Objective Interpretation – Finding the meaning though plainly reading of the 
text itself. This is also called grammatical interpretation. 
• Subjective Interpretation – Finding the meaning by reviewing preparatory 
works of a rule or provision. 
• Teleological Interpretation – Finding the meaning by looking at the purpose a 
given rule is meant to serve 
  
1.4. Limitations 
As the issue is very complex and there are several delimitations to the scope of this 
thesis that I feel is necessary to point out. First of all I feel the need to state that legal 
interpretation is not an exact science, something that the diverging views of the 
various arbitral tribunals in this thesis bears testament to. Secondly this thesis only 
concerns cases where the MFN clause does not explicitly state if the standard applies 
to dispute settlement procedure. 
 
There are several sub-questions that this thesis touches upon, but does not analyse in 
depth. This has mainly to do with issues of space limitations, but moreover it is hard 
to generalize when even similar factual circumstances give very different outcomes. 
For instance if the basic treaty contains a dispute settlement clause, but no choice is 
given to the investor as regards the type of arbitration, can the most-favoured-nation 
clause be invoked to seek the benefit of the options offered in a third-party treaty? 
Another example would be if the basic treaty provides for particular conditions before 
an international arbitration proceeding can be initiated, can a MFN clause be invoked 
to benefit from the more favourable conditions of a third party treaty? I believe 
however that the answer to the diverging outcomes is connected to the general 
question of whether there should be limitations to the operations to the operation of 
the MFN clause in the context of dispute settlement procedure. 
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Another limitation that needs to be pointed out is that the case material analysed 
stems from ICSID arbitration. The merit of limiting the scope of the thesis in this 
respect is that the ICSID tribunals are governed by international treaties. As such they 
are subjected to interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
and the hierarchy of international legal sources. Still, this is not a characteristic that 
ICSID tribunals are sole proprietor of. As an example many BIT tribunals are 
governed by the UNCITRAL arbitration rules. However, since information from 
ICSID is publicly accessible, the valuation of the accuracy of case facts and 
arguments becomes more reliable than information from other institutions. In spite of 
this, in the case of RosInvest v. Russia I have made an exception to this limitation, 
due to the reasoning in the case, which made it highly relevant to add this to the list of 
cases analysed. Due to space limitations I have been forced to only use a handful of 
the background cases that deal with the issue of the scope of the MFN standard. 
Therefore there will be arguments from several cases that are not accounted for in the 
background chapter. 
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 Chapter 2 
Origin and History of the MFN Standard 
 
It is difficult to define a general MFN standard in the context of international 
investment law. All efforts to formulate a universal standard in a multilateral treaty, 
much like the instruments that apply to trade19, have failed.20 A review of how the 
MFN standard is expressed in IIA’s does not yield a uniform picture. What is 
important to illuminate is the apparent distinction between MFN treatment and the 
codification of the MFN treatment in a contractual clause. Some clauses are narrow in 
its scope and definition where as others are very general. This makes it hard to draw 
any general parallels between the sources as to the real scope and purpose of such 
treatment. However with the legal positivist approach of this thesis, the customary 
law codified in article 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and 
article 38 of the ICJ Statute offers some guidance.  
 
With this in mind, this chapter will start of with investigating the origin and history of 
the MFN standard in order to ascertain the process of its legal norm. In the context of 
this thesis this is important to investigate what a parties can reasonably expect from 
an MFN clause and more profoundly if an MFN clause can be extended to dispute 
settlement provisions even when the clause does not explicitly permit this. Since the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Read: GATT, GATS, TRIMS. 
20 See: The Havana Charter which will be discussed further below.	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MFN standard originally stems from international trade law this chapter will explore 
how it has been interpreted in the context of international trade law in order to draw 
an analogy to what can be expected in the context of international investment law. 
From the investigation in this chapter it seems that the mere fact that there is a 
difference in treatment in regards to the dispute settlement provisions in two BIT’s 
would not be enough to constitute at breach of the MFN standard, but instead that 
there needs to be a competitative disadvantage associated with such difference in 
treatment.  
 
2.1. Origin 
Even though International Investment Law is a fairly new concept, the MFN standard 
is a product of international trade policy conducted over several hundred years. As the 
decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of Anglo Iranian Oil 
Company v. Iran suggests21 the lack of a consistent precedence might be a symptom 
that there is no clear uniform understanding to the meaning and purpose of an MFN, 
therefore for the benefit of this investigation the original meaning and intent of the 
clause will be explored.  
 
MFN Treatment has been central pillar of commercial treaties for centuries. The 
standard is originally found in international trade agreements. While it is debated how 
far back you can trace the origin of the standard22, the earliest structure resembling the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case was one of the first considerations by the ICJ on the subject of 
MFN treatment. In the case the U.K. tried to apply the MFN clause in its’ treaty with Iran to invoke a 
later treaty between Iran and Denmark. The court rejected the U.K. claim by stating that the court 
lacked jurisdiction on the grounds that the treaty between Iran and U.K. pre-dated the Iranian 
ratification of the courts jurisdiction. However what is interesting for the analysis of this thesis is that 
the court did not consider the meaning and scope of the MFN clause before declaring its’ decision. See: 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran); 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22) (preliminary Objection) paragraph 109. 
22 Some sources such as the UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment 13, 1999, cites a 1417 Treaty for Mercantile Intercourse between England 
and Flanders, while other sources place the date of origin in the eleventh century such as Ustor, Endre; 
1969; First report on the most-favoured-nation clause; document A/CN.4/213; page 159. However, 
even though these texts strike some resemblance with functions of the modern clause, such as 
reciprocity of trade terms, these favours were only given to a few select nations. Moreover, due to the 
flaws in trade practice of this time, being both sporadic and monopoly orientated, (See: Vesel, Scott; 
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form we see today is found in the fifteenth century.23 However, due to principal 
reasons24 it is first in the eighteenth century that we find the modern understanding of 
the standard as a policy of equal treatment for all trading partners. Even though the 
form of wording varied significantly the intent to reciprocate any advantage granted 
to one party to other parties, remained the same.  
 
In the 1882 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and France 
the standard is phrased: 
Each of the High Contracting Parties engages to give the other immediately 
and unconditionally the benefit of every favor, immunity, or privilege in 
matters of commerce or industry which may have been or may be conceded by 
one of the High Contracting Powers to any third nation whatsoever, whether 
within or beyond Europe.25 
 
In the 1887 British Treaty of Commerce with Honduras the standard is found in: 
The High Contracting Parties agree, that in all matters relating to commerce 
and navigation, any privilege, favor, or immunity whatever which either 
contracting party has actually granted or may hereafter grant to the subjects 
or citizens of any other State shall be extended immediately and 
unconditionally to the subjects or citizens of the other contracting party; it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2007; Clearing a path through tangled jurisprudence: most-favoured-nation clauses and dispute 
settlement provisions in bilateral investment treaties; page 129), it is hard to imagine that a fully 
developed MFN standard would have contributed to international competition. 
23 Ustor, Endre; 1969; First report on the most-favoured-nation clause; document A/CN.4/213; page 
160.	  
24 The reason being that the MFN standard found here functioned not as a guarantee of equal 
opportunity of competition, but was basically a pledge to discriminate in favour of a certain party. 
Kurtz, Jürgen; 2005; The delicate extension of most-favoured-nation treatment to foreign investors: 
Maffezini v kingdom of Spain; In: International investment law and arbitration: leading cases from the 
ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law; Weiler Todd(Ed); page 525.  
25 Barclay, Thomas; 1907; Effects of ”Most-Favoured-Nation” Clause in Commercial Treaties; In: The 
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Nov., 1907); page 26. 
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being their intention that the trade and navigation of each country shall be 
placed in all respects by the other on the footing of the most favoured nation.26 
 
While the Anglo-Roumanian Treaty of 1892 it is phrased: 
The subjects, vessels and goods, produce of the soil and industry of each of the 
two High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the Dominions of the other all 
privileges, immunities, or advantages granted to the most favoured nation.27 
 
From these provisions one can draw two conclusions. First, all of them share the 
unconditional phrasing of the privileges, favours and immunities that the treaties are 
intended to cover.28 The second conclusion to make is that this interpretation goes 
against the United States position at the time, which distinguished between general 
reductions and reductions conditioned by counter reductions by the other contracting 
party, such as reciprocity.29 Historically there has been a division between countries 
adopting policies favouring a conditional form and countries favouring an 
unconditional form. This division was traditionally seen as a division between net 
importers and net exporters where the net importers favoured a restrictive conditional 
interpretation of the standard and net exporters promoted an expansive unconditional 
interpretation.30 
 
It is only after the Second World War we start to see a unified definition of the 
meaning of the MFN Standard with the creation of the General Agreement of Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). The GATT was very much a reaction to the protectionist trade 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Idem. 
27 Idem.	  
28 It should be noted that even though these contracts are all issued through negotiations with Britain, 
they still reflect the overall European practice at the time.  Idem. 
29 Idem. 
30 Ustor, Endre; 1973; Fourth report on the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause; page 101. 
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policies of the inter-war period, which had, only between 1929 and 1934 lead to a 
66% decline in world trade.31 This decline had severe economic consequences and has 
been attributed to trade protectionist measures that the mercantile policies were 
characterized by, such as high increases in tariff levels.32 As a reaction to this 
development the League of Nations International Economic Conference of 1927 
advocated a very extensive MFN interpretation in order to bypass these trade barriers. 
 
The mutual grant of unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment as regards 
Customs duties and conditions of trading is an essential condition of free and 
healthy development of commerce between states” and therefore ”strongly 
recommend that the scope and form of the most-favoured-nation clause should 
be of the widest and most liberal character and that it should not be weakened 
or narrowed either by express provisions or by interpretation.33 
 
However, this promotion was heavily criticized by the Committee of Experts for the 
Progressive Codification of International Law, which stated that: 
 
It would not seem either necessary or desirable even if it were practicable to 
endevour to frame a code provision to govern the case and that the solution to 
the problems [of] interpretating MFN clauses were to be found instead in 
clear drafting and application of the ordinary rules of judicial 
interpretation.34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Winham, Gilbert R.; 1992; The evolution of international trade agreements; page 30. 
32 Kurtz, Jürgen; 2005; The delicate extension of most-favoured-nation treatment to foreign investors: 
Maffezini v kingdom of Spain; In: International investment law and arbitration: leading cases from the 
ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law; Weiler Todd(Ed); page 529. 
33 Scott Vesel; 2007; Clearing a path through a tangled jurisprudence: most-favoured-nation clauses 
and dispute settlement provisions in bilateral investment treaties; page 134.	  
34 Scott Vesel; 2007; Clearing a path through a tangled jurisprudence: most-favoured-nation clauses 
and dispute settlement provisions in bilateral investment treaties; page 134 (quoting The world 
economic conference: final report 34, League of national Doc. C.356.M.129.1927.II (C.E.I.46)(1927)). 
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This suggests that a more liberal interpretation of the MFN standard in international 
trade law was politically motivated. When experts in international law dealt with the 
question however, it was deemed that the consequences of a liberal interpretation 
were undesirable.  
 
The GATT was also a consequence of the policies based on the economic theories of 
trade liberalism such as the theories of free trade and global specialization by Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo and Thomas Friedman. In Riccardo’s book The Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation he suggest that in order to maximise global welfare, 
international trade needs to be free of barriers and nations need to specialize in areas 
of production that is most beneficial to them in terms of use of capital and labour. He 
argued this by stating that: 
The pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal 
good of the whole.35 
 
When reviewing the GATT the relationship between the economic theories of free 
trade is evident in the introduction of the treaty with: 
Recognizing that their (the parties) relations in the field of trade and 
economic endeavour should be conducted with the view to raise standards of 
living, ensure full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of 
real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of 
the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods.36 
 
The MFN standard is found in article I:1 of the GATT. It states: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ricardo, David; 2004; The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation; page 81. 
36 GATT preamble. 
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With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importing or exporting or imposed on the international 
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of 
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities 
in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all 
matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of article III,* any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties.37 
 
This means that in respect to market access, any advantage given to any product 
originating in or destined for one country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to like products originating in or destined for all other members. 
 
However, it should be pointed out that even though the formation of the GATT is 
seen as a start to a uniform approach to a unconditional application of the MFN 
standard, article I:1 does not prohibit all forms of tariff discrimination between 
foreign parties. Basically we can talk about four different categories of lawful 
discrimination. Firstly we have the discrimination that is allowed under article XX 
and XXI, which lists exceptions to the treaty.  
 
Secondly discrimination is allowed under the 1979 GATT Decision on Differential 
and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries paragraph 1 and Article XXXVI:8 of GATT, which allows for positive 
discrimination  towards less-developed members in trade negotiations.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 GATT article I:1. 
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Thirdly discrimination is allowed on the basis on defence against unfair competition 
under the agreement on Anti-Dumping38 respective the Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement.39 
 
Fourthly there is discrimination under the concept of like product. Due to the 
stipulation of the clause that the standard should be afforded as long as the products 
are like, the article “manages to tolerate a form of reciprocity”40 fundamentally at 
odds with the MFN principle since the function of the standard is to avoid behaviour 
of trade protection.41  
 
These exceptions to MFN treatment in GATT represent the norm that the MFN 
standard’s purpose is to prevent distortion in competition between otherwise 
competitive goods.42 
 
After the formation of the GATT we find today that the MFN standard has been 
extended beyond its original application to trade in goods to the fields of trade in 
services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights through the WTO 
Agreement.43 A second observation to make is the incorporation of the Understanding 
on Rules and Procedure Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) into the WTO. 
The mechanisms provided in the DSU guarantees states to bring disputes concerning 
trade agreements before an international panel empowered to issue binding decisions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See: Agreement on the implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994. 
39 See: Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
40 Kurtz, Jürgen; 2005; The delicate extension of most-favoured-nation treatment to foreign investors: 
Maffezini v kingdom of Spain; In: International investment law and arbitration: leading cases from the 
ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law; Weiler Todd(Ed); page 529. 
41 Idem. 
42 Hudec, Robert E.; 2000; “Like Product”: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III; 
page 4. 
43 See: Article II GATS and Article 4 TRIPS. 
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on the parties.44 From this it seems that substantive and procedural provisions are 
separated within the WTO convention. 
 
With much of the success associated with the codification of international trade law, 
several tries have been made to transfer the same multilateral legal structures to 
international investment law, though the formation of a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI). Yet, non of the efforts have been successful. The first effort 
towards forming an MAI was during the negotiations for the proposed International 
Trade Organization. During the negotiations, articles of investment protection were 
introduced with provisions covering MFN treatment.45 The negotiating parties were 
unable to agree to this however, resulting in the final draft, the Havana Charter for the 
International Trade Organization, only covering issues of investment protection under 
a prohibition on unreasonable or unjustifiable action.46 A second attempt was made 
during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, with the majority of the GATT 
members rejecting the proposal in favour of focusing on clarification on measures that 
were breaching already existing GATT obligation.47 
 
Following the failed efforts for investment protection during the Uruguay Round, the 
United States promoted negotiations for a MAI within the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)48. Again the negotiations failed, mostly due 
to several high public profile investment claims within the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and raised concerns by non-governmental organizations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See: article 2 and article 16 paragraph 4 of DSU. 
45 Brewer, T.L., Young, S.; 1998; The Multilateral Investment System and Multinational Enterprises; 
page 70-73. 
46 Havana Charter for the International Trade Organization; Article 11:1(b). 
47 Civello, P.; 1999; the TRIMS Agreement: A Failed Attempt at Investment Liberalization; page 97.	  
48 Newcombe, Andrew, Paradell Lluís; 2009; Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of 
Treatment; page 55. 
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(NGO’s) regarding procedural and substantive protections given under investment 
treaties.49 
 
Still, even though all efforts to form an MAI have been unsuccessful, the standard has 
effectively been transferred to BIT treaties. However, where the MFN treatment in 
international trade agreements only applies to boarder measures, the application of 
MFN treatment to investment issues is more complex since an investment is 
conducted within the territory of the host-state and under a longer period of time.50 
 
To sum up, historically the scope and definition of the MFN standard has varied up 
until the formation of the GATT and the later WTO. In order to side step legal 
barriers to trade that produced economically damaging effects it has been suggested 
that a liberal interpretation to the scope of the standard should be practiced. However, 
it seems that such interpretation policies were politically motivated and when 
analysed by legal experts, liberal interpretations of the standard were deemed 
undesirable. Even though the idea of the GATT and the WTO seems to be to promote 
free trade and to reduce the same barriers to international trade, within the WTO 
substantive and procedural provisions appears separated and the scope of the MFN 
clause seems to be restricted in many ways. 
 
In the following sub-chapters it will be discussed what type of implications the 
transfer of the MFN standard from issues relating to international trade law to 
international investment law. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Idem. 
50 For a definition of investment and differentiation from trade see: Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and 
Italstrade S.p.A. v. Morocco (Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July; 2001) paragraph 52. 
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2.2. The ILC Articles 
MFN treatment is defined by the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft articles 
on MFN as:   
... treatment accorded by the granting State to the beneficiary State, or to 
persons or things in a determined relationship with that State, not less 
favourable than treatment extended by the granting State to a third State or to 
persons or things in the same relationship with that third State.51 
 
And an MFN clause as: 
… a treaty provision whereby a State undertakes an obligation towards 
another State to accord most-favoured-nation treatment in an agreed sphere 
of relations.52 
 
These expressions are based on the ILC’s interpretation of the general practice by 
states in the context of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and are not 
legally precise entities.53 However, in the context of international investment, MFN 
treatment guarantees that a host state extends to a foreign investor and investment that 
is covered by the MFN clause in question, relevant treatment that is no less favourable 
than that which it accords to foreign investors of any third country.54 Therefore these 
expressions serve as a good starting point for analysis of the concept of a MFN 
standard.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 International Law Commission; 1978; Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses with 
Commentaries; page 21. 
52 Idem. Page 18. 
53 Idem.  
54 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; 2010; Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment; 
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II; page 13.	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Two comments should be made to the definition of MFN. Firstly, in the commentaries 
to the draft articles the ILC affirms the hypothesis of the thesis that the MFN standard 
is an explicit obligation. 
 
Speaking strictly, there is no such thing as the most-favoured-nation clause: 
every treaty requires independent examination... There are innumerable m.f.n. 
clauses, but there is only one m.f.n. standard".These considerations were 
taken into account in drafting article 4 [,which codefies the MFN standard].55 
 
Secondly it should be noted that under article 4 of the Draft articles is it striking that 
there is no formal requirement for an MFN clause.56 This means that a MFN clause 
can be formulated in many different ways and that there are no requirements as to the 
structure and word use when drafting it. An MFN clause is simply an expression of a 
granting state undertakes the obligation of providing MFN treatment to a beneficiary 
state.  
 
2.3. Scope and Structure 
Much like the purpose of the MFN standard in the context of international trade, MFN 
treatment in international investment law ensures the equality of competitive 
conditions between foreign investors of different nationalities. However, where the 
scope of application in international trade law is restricted to border measures 
regarding market access, most international investments are conducted within the 
territories of state, meaning behind state borders. Due to this the MFN standard has a 
different scope of application. 
 
The standard has three fundamental legal features in regard to its scope of application: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 International Law Commission; 1978; Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses with 
Commentaries; page 20. 
56 Idem. Page 18-20. 
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I.  It is a treaty-based obligation. Even though there is no pro forma requirement 
and it can be argued that the inclusion of MFN protection in IIA’s is an almost 
universal treaty practice, it is clear from article 7 of the ILC’s draft articles on MFN 
that states grant this benefit and gains this obligation from a specific clause contained 
in a binding treaty.57  
 
Nothing in the present articles shall imply that a State is entitled to be 
accorded most-favoured-nation treatment by another State otherwise than on 
the basis of an international obligation undertaken by the latter State.58 
 
From the commentaries to the article it is apparent the opinio juris of the matter has 
crystallized to the same position. 
 
In practice, such an obligation cannot normally be proved otherwise than by 
means of a most-favoured- nation clause, i.e. a conventional undertaking by 
the granting State to that effect.59 
 
Although the grant of most-favoured-nation treatment is frequent in 
commercial treaties, there is no evidence that it has developed into a rule of 
customary international law. 60 
 
This means that states are not bound by customary international law to extend or 
receive this obligation.61 The claim to be given access to the same rights as a state that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 International Law Commission; 1978; Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses with 
Commentaries; page 24. 
58 Idem.	  
59 Idem. 
60 Idem. 
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is placed in a favoured position can only be made on the basis of an explicit 
commitment of the state granting the favours in the form of a conventional 
stipulation, that being a most-favoured-nation clause.62 This is in terms with the 
recognized principle of freedom of contract.63 From the ILC work it is however 
striking that such commitment does not possess a requirement to be in written form.  
 
While most-favoured-nation clauses, i.e. treaty provisions, constitute in most 
cases the basis for a claim to most- favoured-nation treatment, it is not 
impossible even at present that such claims might be based on oral 
agreements.64 
 
II.  It is restrained by the principle of Ejusdem Generis.65 This means that the 
MFN standard can only be applied to the like subject-matters and/or class that the 
basic treaty in question describes and questions of interpretation of the meaning of 
ambiguous words or phrases may only be done within the sphere of these categories. 
Within IIA’s, the MFN standard refers to investors and investments as subjects. 
Depending on the substantive scope of an MFN clause, the MFN treatment can be 
applied extensively to all matters of the investment or just to an individual stage of the 
investment such as investment access or investment protection. 
 
III.  It is a relative standard. This means that it is not standard with an a priori 
definition and therefore requires a two-tier test of comparison of treatments between 
two foreign investors in like circumstances. To ascertain a claimed violation of the 
obligation, the investigation must affirm an objective difference in treatment between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Idem. It should also be noted that the MFN standard is separated from the principle of non-
discrimination under international law.  
62 Idem., page 12. 
63 See: VCLT preamble paragraph 3. 
64 International Law Commission; 1978; Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses with 
Commentaries; Page 25. 
65 Idem. Page 27. 
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two foreign investors, but also that this difference in treatment has lead to a direct 
competitive disadvantage.66 
 
This raises two questions regarding the application namely, whether the investments 
or investors in question are comparable ( in the same relationship) and whether there 
has been less favourable treatment.67 However before applying MFN treatment there 
is a crucial threshold question to be addressed, namely, what is the subject matter of 
the MFN clause – to what rights does the clause apply?68 As seen above in the ILC’s 
draft articles, the beneficiary of the MFN clause acquires “only those rights which fall 
within the limits of the subject matter of the clause”69.  
 
An MFN clause in a basic treaty does not technically incorporate by reference the 
provisions of the third-party treaty.70 The ICJ noted in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. that the 
MFN clause extends the rights enjoyed by the third party on the beneficiary.71 The 
MFN clause can grant no benefit if the third party’s rights come to an end, such as 
where the third-party treaty has been terminated.72 An MFN clause does not when it 
becomes applicable, crystallize or incorporate by reference the more favourable 
treatment afforded by a third-party treaty.73 Access to more favourable treatment is 
only available as long as the party is able to obtain the advantage in question74 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Idem. Page 19 and 27. 
67 Newcombie, Andrew, Paradell, Lluís; 2009; Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of 
Treatment; page 196. 
68 Idem. Page 197. 
69 International Law Commission; 1978; Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses with 
Commentaries; page 27. 
70 Newcombie, Andrew, Paradell, Lluís; 2009; Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of 
Treatment; page 197. 
71 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (UK v. Iran) (1952) ICJ Rep 93 paragraph 109. 
72 Newcombie, Andrew, Paradell, Lluís; 2009; Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of 
Treatment; page 197.	  
73 Idem. 
74 Idem.	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To sum up the scope of a specific MFN clause is all dependents on the explicit 
wording and substantive scope of application. Within IIA’s the maximum extension is 
however matters of investment. Still, for a breach of obligation under the MFN clause 
the claim must pass a two-tier test that affirms that there is just not a difference in 
treatment between two foreign investors, but that the difference in treatment is a 
direct competitive disadvantage.75 
 
2.4. Purpose 
Georg Schwarzenberger argued regarding the standards purpose that:  
…it is clear that MFN clauses serve as insurance against incompetent 
draftmanship and lack of imagination on the part of those who are responsible 
for the conclusion of international treaties76 
 
This explanation of the purpose of the MFN standard seems too simplistic however. 
First of all, state intend to write what they write. Therefore it would seem odd and not 
intended to apply ‘an insurance against incompetent draftmanship’. Secondly, as 
stated above, the purpose of the MFN standard seems to prevent discrimination 
against foreign investors based on their nationality.77 This does not mean that a host 
state is obligated to grant identical treatment to investors operating within its 
boarders. Instead it is adequate for the host state to extend a treatment that is not ‘less 
favourable’ than the treatment afforded to the most favoured foreign investor.78 When 
the standard is incorporated applying the same standard to IIA’s the clause thereby 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75Gerber, Jean-Daniel; Preferential Trade Agreements and the Most Favoured Nation Principle; 2007;  
Page 12. 
76 Schwarzenberger, Georg; 1945; The Most-Favoured-Nation Standard in British State Practice; page 
100. 
77 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues, p. 191. 
78 UNCTAD, Trends in international investment agreements, p. 60. 
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seeks to guarantee equal competitive opportunities for foreign investors in a host 
state. 
 
To conclude this chapter the MFN standard provides that foreign investors and 
investments are entitled to the same or no less favourable treatment than the host state 
provides to foreign investors and investments from third-party states. Claims 
regarding IIA’s and violations of the MFN standard will therefore circulate around the 
issue of whether the host state, the granting state, has provided less favourable 
treatment to investments or investors from the beneficiary state, than what is afforded 
to third state parties.79 What is important to assess when investigating a claimed 
violation of the standard is that there is just not a difference in treatment but that is 
actually less favourable. 
 
From the history of the MFN standard in the context of international trade law it 
would seem that the standard was variably interpreted and applied, until the formation 
of a multilateral legal system in form of the GATT and WTO. In the context of 
international investment law an analogy suggests that the inconsistency of the 
interpretation of the MFN standard will remain until a equivalent legal system to the 
GATT and WTO is implement in order to create uniformity of the wording and 
meaning of the MFN standard. 
 
Furthermore, an analogy to international trade law would suggest that the mere fact 
that there is a difference in treatment in regards to the dispute settlement provisions in 
two BIT’s would not be enough to constitute at breach of the MFN standard. Instead 
there needs to be a competitative disadvantage associated with a difference in 
treatment.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Newcombie, Andrew, Paradell, Lluís; 2009; Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of 
Treatment; page 197. 
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 Chapter 3 
Interpretation of the MFN Clause in Practice 
 
Up until ten years ago the accepted opinion appears to be that the MFN standard only 
applied to substantive provisions unless the language of the clause explicitly stated 
the contrary. As Arbitrator Brigitte Stern comments:  
 
It cannot be contested that until the decision in Maffezini, “the ordinary 
meaning to be given” – to use the terms of Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties – to the term “treatment” concerned the 
protection of substantial rights, and did not encompass any access to specific 
procedures of settlement of disputes concerning these rights, which are always 
an exception in international law.80 
 
However, the groundbreaking interpretation in Maffezini can be seen as the starting 
point to the concept that the scope of the MFN standard may be extended to 
incorporate dispute settlement provisions and questions of jurisdiction. Since then a 
number of ICSID Tribunals have interpreted and evaluated the Maffezini position 
with varying outcomes. In this chapter some of these cases will be accounted for in 
order to provide a brief background of the presented arguments for and against an 
MFN extension into procedural provisions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Stern, Brigitte; 2011; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17); 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion; paragraph 27. 
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3.1. The Maffezini Interpretation 
Maffezini v. Spain81 was not unique in its subject matter or legal issue. In the past 
fifty years there have been a number of claims submitted for international arbitration 
regarding the interpretation of the standard in IIA’s.82 What made Maffezini so unique 
that some sources speak of a doctrine is this: 
 
The Maffezini case dealt with the legal issue as to whether an investor (Argentina) 
could avoid a provision in a BIT that required the claimant to bring proceedings in a 
domestic court and continue those proceedings for eighteen months before resorting 
the dispute to international arbitration.  
 
The claimant, Emilio Agustin Maffezini (a national of Argentine), brought a claim 
before ICSID in January of 2000 against the Kingdom of Spain. The claim consisted 
of that the provision of a third party BIT between Spain and Chile of 1991 was more 
beneficial to the claimant and thereby the claimant had a right to be extended the 
same right. This claim was backed by the invocation of the provisions in the basic 
treaty between Argentina and Spain, the 1991 Argentine-Spain Bilateral Investment 
Treaty, which contained an MFN clause formulated in broad terms. 
 
“In all matters subject to this Agreement, this treatment shall be not less favourable 
than that extended by each Party to the investments made in its territory by investors 
of a third country”83 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB 97/7, 25 January 2000. (2002) 5 ICSID Rep. P.396. 
82 See: Ambiatelos claim (Greece v. united kingdom), 1956 and Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran); 
1952. 
83 Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB 97/7, 25 January 2000. (2002) 5 ICSID Rep. P.396. Paragraph 38.	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The Argentine-Spain BIT required the that the dispute had to be addressed by the 
domestic court for a period of eighteen months before the dispute could be submitted 
to international arbitration. The Chile-Spain BIT imposed no such conditions, but 
instead enabled investors to submit its claims for international arbitrations after only 
six months.84 
 
The claimant argued that investors of Chilean nationality were treated more 
favourably than investors of Argentine nationality and that the MFN clause in the 
Argentine-Spain BIT gave him the right to be accorded the benefits extended to 
investors under the Chile-Spain BIT.  
 
The respondent, the Kingdom of Spain, contended that the claimant could not invoke 
third party treaties on the grounds of the res inter alios acta doctrine, meaning that the 
claim is irrelevant since it did not regard the same subject matter, and that under the 
ejusdem generis principle the MFN clause could only be applied to the same subject 
matter of the basic treaty.85 Spain further argued that the purpose of the MFN clause 
is to avoid discrimination and that such discrimination can only take place in 
connection with material economic treatment, thereby it could not be extended to 
procedural matters. To make such an extension it had to be proven that the resort to 
the Spanish domestic court would have a negative material effect and less 
advantageous to the investor than submitting the claim directly to ICSID arbitration86 
 
The tribunal rejected this argument and held in favour of the claimant. Since the MFN 
clause in the basic treaty was drafted in broad terms and explicitly referred to “…all 
matters subject to this Agreement”87, the Tribunal took the position that the claimant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Idem. Paragraph 39. 
85 Idem. Paragraph 41. 
86 Idem. Paragraph 42. 
87 Idem. Paragraph 49.	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had convincingly demonstrated that the scope of the MFN clause in Argentine-Spain 
BIT extended to the dispute settlement provisions of the treaty and that the claimant 
was able to rely on, in their view, the more favourable dispute settlement provisions 
contained in the Chile-Spain BIT.88 
 
In arriving at this conclusion the Tribunal placed special emphasis on several factors: 
• The need to identify the intention of the contracting parties.89 
• The importance of assessing the past practice of States regarding the inclusion 
of the MFN clause in other BIT’s.90 
• The importance to take into deliberation public policy considerations.91 
 
Regarding the ejusdem generis principle, the principal question that was contemplated 
was whether dispute settlement provisions of a third-party treaty were reasonably 
related to the treatment accorded under the MFN clause of the basic treaty. In order to 
answer such a question the Tribunal stated that it was important to deduce the 
intention of the contracting parties. In this regard, the Tribunal reviewed prior 
international jurisprudence, and specially referred to the Ambatielos case. In that case 
the Commission of Arbitration had confirmed the relevance of the ejusdem generis 
principle, verifying that the MFN clause could only attract matters belonging to the 
same category of subject matter. However the commission of arbitration stipulated 
that “the question can only be determined in accordance with the intention of the 
Contracting Parties as deduced from a reasonable interpretation of the Treaty”92 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Idem. Paragraph 50, 61. 
89 Idem. Paragraph 49. 
90 Idem. Paragraph 57-58. 
91 Idem. Paragraph 56. 
92 Idem. Paragraph 49.	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Following this way of reasoning the Tribunal investigated the specific formulations of 
the MFN provisions in other BIT’s and found a distinction between BIT’s with 
contained a MFN clause which expressly granted that the MFN treatment extended to 
provisions on dispute settlement, and BIT’s which contained a MFN clause that did 
not expressly provide that dispute settlement was covered by the clause. In the latter 
case the clauses examined contained phrases such as “all rights contained in the 
present Agreement” or “all matters subjects to this Agreement”.93 
 
Since the MFN clause in the Maffezini case belonged to the latter category the 
Tribunal noted that: “it must be established whether the omission was intended by the 
parties or can reasonably be inferred from the practice followed by the parties in their 
treatment of foreign investors and their own investors”94 
 
The Tribunal expanded on this logic and concluded that in the current economic 
context it is reasonable to assume that settlement procedure is inextricably to the 
protection of investors, as the MFN standard relate to protection of traders under 
commercial treaties. It stated that in the past, extraterritorial jurisdiction were 
considered essential for the protection of traders rights and should not be regarded as 
a mere procedural device, but as mechanisms designed to increase the protection of 
rights for these persons. Therefore:  
 
…if a third party treaty contains provisions for the settlement of disputes that 
are more favourable to the protection of the investor’s rights and interests 
than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be extended to the 
beneficiary of the most favoured nation clause as they are fully compatible 
with the ejusdem generis principle.95 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Idem. Paragraph 52-53. 
94 Idem. Paragraph 53. 
95 Idem. Paragraph 56.	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From this it seems the Tribunal endorsed an extension of a broadly formulated MFN 
clause to settlement dispute provisions. However it should be noted that the Tribunal 
emphasised that such extension could only be done if the third party treaty related to 
the same subject matter as the basic treaty, in accordance with the ejusdem generis 
principle. The Tribunal made the conclusion that the subject matter of the MFN 
clause was “investment protection” and therefore the scope of the basic treaty, 
formulated as “all matters”, could be extended without an apparent breach of the 
ejusdem generis principle. 
 
The Tribunal noted that the application of the MFN standard to dispute settlement 
provisions would result in the harmonisation and enlargement of the scope of 
application of such provisions.96 However the Tribunal seemed to be aware of the 
potential problems associated with a broad interpretation of the standard and 
underlined that: 
 
As a matter of principle, the beneficiary of the clause should not be able to 
override public policy considerations that the contracting parties might have 
envisaged as fundamental conditions for their acceptance of the agreement in 
question, particularly if the beneficiary is a private investor, as will often be 
the case. The scope of the clause might thus be narrower than it appears at 
first sight.97 
 
The Tribunal also pointed out that the Maffezini interpretation could not bypass 
requirements such as: 
• Where the contracting parties have conditioned its consent to arbitration on the 
exhaustion of local remedies. This requirement could not be circumvent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Idem. Paragraph 62. 
97 Idem. 
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because the stipulated condition reflects a fundamental rule of international 
law98 
• Dispute settlement provisions, which include “the fork in the road”. Such 
requirement stipulates that there has to be a choice between submission to 
domestic courts or to international arbitration and that this choice once made 
becomes final and irreversible. This cannot be bypassed because such action 
would violate the principle of ‘finality of arrangements’, which is considered 
an important principle of public policy.99 
• Disputes being brought up for settlement at a particular forum.100 
• Agreements to use a “highly institutionalised system of arbitration that 
incorporates précis rules of procedure (e.g. NAFTA)”. Such arrangements 
could not be altered though the interpretation of the standard since such 
provisions reflect the precise will of the contracting parties.101 
 
As a final reflection of the use of the Maffezini interpretation the Tribunal stressed the 
distinction “…between the legitimate extension of rights and benefits by means of the 
operation of the clause, on the one hand, and disruptive treaty-shopping that would 
play havoc with the policy objectives underlying specific treaty provisions, on the 
other.”102 
 
From this it appears that the Tribunal was aware of some of the possible difficulties 
arising out of this interpretation. It however left many questions unanswered such as 
what would qualify as disruptive treaty-shopping and what principles these exceptions 
were based on. On the same note it would have been helpful if the Tribunal had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Idem. Paragraph 63.	  
99 Idem. 
100 Idem. 
101 Idem. 
102 Idem.	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developed its reasoning concerning the division between the condition of exhaustion 
of local remedies and the condition of exhaustion of local remedies under a certain 
period of time. This does not seem to be a straightforward conclusion to make. 
 
3.2. Post-Maffezini Cases Speaking in Favour of the Maffezini 
Interpretation 
The jurisprudence consistent with the Maffezini interpretation seems to reflect a 
disposition by the Tribunals in these cases, to hold a strong association between 
accesses to international dispute settlement procedures and fundamental elements of 
investor protection.  
 
3.2.1. Siemens v. Argentine 
One of the prominent cases belonging to this category is Siemens v. Argentine.103 In it 
the claimant, Siemens, tried to avoid a six-months negotiation period in domestic 
court required by the basic treaty, the Germany-Argentina BIT of 1991, with the use 
of its MFN clause. The third party treaty, Chile-Argentina BIT, did not possess such 
requirement and was therefore said to hold a more favourable treatment than the 
Germany-Argentina BIT. 
 
The arguments put forward by both the claimant and the respondent holds high 
resemblance with the ones in the Maffezini case. The respondent argued that the 
claimant lacked standing to bring the claim to international arbitration since it had not 
performed the six months requirement of domestic negotiations provided by in the 
basic treaty. The claimant argued that the requirement should be bypassed due to the 
fact that the Chile-Argentina BIT did not contain such requirement and that this was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 3 
August 2004. 
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more favourable treatment, which the MFN clause of the basic treaty was designed to 
neutralize.  
 
The respondent argued against such interpretation by claiming that the MFN clause 
only covered like subject matters and that the dispute settlement provisions were 
therefore not covered by the clause since it belonged to a different ‘genus’. “Unless 
expressly provided for, the MFN clause does not implicitly extend to procedural 
matters”104 
 
The Tribunal followed the logic of the Maffezini Tribunal and found that there was no 
reason to make a distinction between substantive and procedural matters as the 
dispute settlement mechanisms of the treaty is part of the protection of investors 
offered under the treaty and therefore qualify as treatment of foreign investors and 
investments. Therefore the MFN clause is applicable to procedure provisions.105 
 
What distinguishes Siemens from Maffezini however is that the Tribunal in Siemens 
took this view even though the MFN clause did only apply to ‘treatment’ and not to 
‘all matters’ which is broader in its definition. Tribunal takes on a reasoning regarding 
the purpose of the MFN clause, which appears to override the intention of the parties 
regarding the specially negotiated narrow formulation of the MFN clause. 
 
…the purpose of the MFN Clause is to eliminate the effects of specially 
negotiated provisions, unless they have been excepted. It complements the 
undertaking of each State party to the treaty, not to apply measures 
discriminatory to investments under Article 2106 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Idem. Paragraph 46. 
105 Idem. Paragraph 102. 
106 Idem. Paragraph 106.	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This means that the purpose of the MFN clause in their view is not to offer equal 
competitive opportunities for foreign investors, but to abolish any type of 
discrimination. Through the reasoning of the Siemens Tribunal, it would seem that 
there would be no reason to do a two-tier comparison test in order to ascertain if there 
has been a violation of the standard as explained in chapter 2.3. In the Tribunals eyes 
the mere fact that there is a difference in treatment, even though no a competitive 
disadvantage is a result from such difference, would be grounds for a violation. 
 
A second distinction to be made between the two cases is that the Tribunal in Siemens 
seemed to have taken a position away from one of the restrictions set out by the 
Maffezini tribunal regarding the application of the Maffezini approach in that the 
MFN clause should not be used as a ‘treaty shopping’ tool. The Siemens Tribunal 
ruled that the more favourable treatment guaranteed by the MFN clause could only be 
extended to more advantageous provisions to the beneficiary and not the whole 
treaty.107 A consequence of this approach, it has been argued, is that it offsets the 
balancing of interests and rights and duties between the parties that a contract actually 
represents.108 Judging from the wording of the award it does seem possible to draw 
that logic to that end, but the Tribunal points out109 that in the end it depends on the 
wording of the individual clause. 
 
Another interesting feature is that the Tribunal appeared to have explicitly rejected 
arguments based on the expressio unius110 principle by stating: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Idem. Paragraph 108-109. 
108 Perera, Rohan; The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause and the Maffezini case; ILC Study Group on the 
MFN Clause; Paragraph 40. 
109 Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 3 
August 2004. Paragraph 108. 
110 An argument that is based on the mention of one item or a list of items in a provision excludes the 
relevance of other items. Schreuer, Christoph; 2006; Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty 
Interpretation in Investment Arbitration; Page 6-7. 
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If a matter is dealt with in a provision of the Treaty and not specifically 
mentioned under other provisions, it does not necessarily follow that the other 
provisions should be considered to exclude the matter especially covered.111 
 
This is a very liberal position that only two more Tribunal adopted between 1998 and 
2006.112 
 
An interesting observation in this case is also that Argentina’s view changed when it 
was the respondent. In the Maffezini trial the Argentine claimant argued that the MFN 
clause did extend to dispute settlement procedure and was not restricted to substantive 
matters.113 In the Siemens case, Argentina was the respondent and took the position 
that such extension is wrong and that the Tribunal in the Maffezini case: 
 
 …did not take adequate note of the significant differences between the 
substantive issues raised in that case and the issues of a jurisdictional 
nature.114 
 
3.2.2. Gas Natural SDG v. Argentine115 
In the case Gas Natural SDG v. Argentine the arguments presented by the parties 
were also very similar compared to Maffezini. The Claimant invoked the MFN clause 
in the basic treaty in order to avoid an eighteen months domestic negotiation 
requirement by pointing to the Argentina-US BIT of 1991, which did not contain such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 3 
August 2004. Paragraph 140. 
112 Fauchald, Ole Kristian; 2008; The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis; 
Page 327. 
113 Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB 97/7, 25 January 2000. (2002) 5 ICSID Rep. Paragraph 40. 
114 Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 3 
August 2004. Paragraph 53. 
115 Gas Natural SDG, S.A: v. The Argentine Republic (Decision of the Tribunal on the Preliminary 
Questions of Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, 17 June 2005.	  
	   39	  
requirement. The Respondent argued against and held that the MFN clause only 
related to substantive matters and procedural matters, such as dispute settlement.116 
The Tribunal reasoned that the claimant was able to take advantage of the dispute 
settlement provisions in the Argentina-US BIT since: 
 
…access to such arbitration only after resort to national courts and an 
eighteen-month waiting period is a less favourable degree of protection than 
access to arbitration immediately upon expiration of the negotiation period117 
 
The Tribunal also made a statement considering the issue of whether dispute 
settlement provisions of BIT’s constitute the package of protection granted to 
investors by the host state. From a review of the history of the ICSID convention and 
its jurisprudence to the development of BIT creation, it stated that one of the most 
crucial elements of this evolution has been the provision connected to independent 
international arbitration between host-state and investor and an essential part of 
foreign direct investment protection.118 
 
3.2.3. RosInvest v. Russia 
RosInvest v. Russia119 is another example of an arbitration tribunal taking a very 
liberal interpretation of the MFN clause in regards to the importation of third party 
treaties dispute settlement procedure. In the award the Tribunal broadened the 
jurisdictional scope of the basic treaty, beyond disputes relating to expropriation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Perera, Rohan; The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause and the Maffezini case; ILC Study Group on the 
MFN Clause; Paragraph 42. 
117 Gas Natural SDG, S.A: v. The Argentine Republic (Decision of the Tribunal on the Preliminary 
Questions of Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, 17 June 2005; Paragraph 31. 
118 Idem. Paragraph 29. 
119 RosInvestCo UK Ltd. V. The Russian Federation (award on Jurisdiction), Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, October, 2007.	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compensation. It followed the ruling that submission to international arbitration was 
an important part of investor protection and that even though: 
 
…the application of the MFN clause of Article 3 widens the scope of Article 
8120 and thus is in conflict to its limitation, this is a normal result of the 
application of MFN clauses, the very character and intention of which is that 
protection not accepted in one treaty is widened by transferring the protection 
accorded in another treaty.121 
 
Following this logic the tribunal contemplated the distinction between substantive and 
procedural provisions regarding application to the MFN clause and found that it did 
not.  
if it applies to substantive protection, then it should apply even more to “only” 
procedural protection.122  
 
 
3.2.4. Conclusion 
To sum up this sub-chapter, there are many similarities in the facts and arguments 
referred to in these cases. First of all, many of them refere to claims that a negoiation 
period before refering the case to international arbitration is a violation of MFN 
treatment. The Respondents view is also that the MFN clause does not cover 
prodecural rights if it does not explicitly say so.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 The article of dispute settlement. 
121 RosInvestCo UK Ltd. V. The Russian Federation (award on Jurisdiction), Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, October, 2007. Paragraph 131. 
122 Idem. Paragraph 132. 
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3.3. Post-Maffezini Cases Speaking Against the Maffezini 
Interpretation 
The liberal interpretation was however not unchallenged. A couple of prominent cases 
took a more restrictive approach to MFN extensions. One was Salini v. Jordan.123 The 
Salini case was one of the early cases, which could be seen marking the beginning of 
a trend in the restrictive application of the Maffezini doctrine.124 
 
3.3.1. Salini v. Jordan 
It concerned a dispute that occurred during the construction of a dam in Jordan and 
dealt with the amount credit payable by the respondent, the Kingdom of Jordan, and 
the investment loss that resulted in the failure to repay those credits. The dispute was 
sent to ICSID arbitration, by the claimant, incorporated under Italian law, under the 
Italy-Jordan BIT.125  
 
The dispute settlement provisions in the basic treaty required the parties to negotiate 
an amicable solution to the dispute for six months where after, if no solution to the 
dispute could be found, the dispute could either go to domestic court or ICSID 
arbitration.126  
 
 
However, the basic treaty also stipulated that: “In case the investor and an entity of 
the Contracting Parties have stipulated an investment Agreement, the procedure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Decision on 
Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, 29 November 2004. 
124 Perera, Rohan; The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause and the Maffezini case; ILC Study Group on the 
MFN Clause; Paragraph 52. 
125 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Decision on 
Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, 29 November 2004; Paragraph 14-19. 
126 Idem. Paragraph 66. 
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foreseen in such investment Agreement shall apply.”127 The investment agreement 
between the parties stated that any contractual dispute would be settled through 
amicable negotiation, which, if necessary, would be followed settlement in domestic 
court or if the parties agreed to it, the dispute would be referred to arbitration.128  
 
 
The Claimant submitted that they could rely on the MFN clause in the basic treaty to 
invoke the dispute settlement provisions in the US-Jordan BIT, which gave the 
investors the right to refer a dispute to ICSID arbitration “regardless of any clause in 
the investment agreement providing for a different dispute settlement mechanism.”129  
 
The claimant argued that under the MFN clause of the basic treaty stipulated that 
Italian investors were entitled to treatment no less favourable than the treatment 
extended to third States and added that the procedural provisions of a BIT are 
essential part of the protection of the rights of the investor.130 
 
Even though the Tribunal did not expressly disagree with the Maffezini doctrine, it 
voiced concerns regarding the extensive MFN interpretation held by the Maffezini 
Tribunal.131 It declined jurisdiction over the dispute based on the MFN clause and 
stated that: 
 
…the Claimants have submitted nothing from which it might be established 
that the common intention of the Parties was to have the most-favoured-nation 
clause apply to dispute settlement.132 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Idem. 
128 Idem. Paragraph 71. 
129 Idem. Paragraph 21.	  
130 Idem. Paragraph 36. 
131 Idem. Paragraph 114-115. 
132 Idem. Paragraph 119. 
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It also stressed that its’ case differed in the circumstances to Maffezini as the clause in 
question did not refer to all matters133 
 
3.3.2. Plama v. Bulgaria 
The Plama case134 stands in stark contrast to the Maffezini interpretation. It dealt with 
a dispute between a Cypriot investor and the Bulgarian government, concerning the 
claimed Bulgarian efforts to cause obstacles and material damages to a company 
owned by the investor.135 
 
The claimant argued jurisdiction to ICSID by invoking the MFN clause of the basic 
treaty, The Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT of 1987, and part V of the Energy Charter Treaty. 
The Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT was limited to ICSID arbitration of disputes concerning 
fixing the amount of compensation after Bulgarian courts had ruled on the merits of 
the underlying dispute. By relying on the MFN clause in the basic treaty, the claimant 
sought to overcome the limitations, by importing the dispute resolution provisions of 
the Bulgaria-Finland BIT, which provided for a wider jurisdiction. 
 
The tribunal rejected the claimants requests and stated that judging from the history of 
Bulgarias trade negotiations, Bulgaria had favoured BIT’s with limited protections for 
foreign investors and limited dispute settlement provisions.136 From this the tribunal 
concluded that the contracting states had not intended the MFN provisions to 
incorporate more generous dispute settlement procedures from more recent Bulgarian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Idem. Paragraphs 117-118.	  
134 Plama Consortium Ltd v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 
February 2005. 
135 Idem. Paragraph 21. 
136 Idem. Paragraph 192 and 196. 
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BIT’s.137 It further declared that an agreement to arbitrate must be “clear and 
unambiguous”138 and therefore, if an MFN clause was to be used to encompass an 
agreement to arbitrate found in another BIT, the parties’ intention to do so must also 
be clear and unambiguous.139 Since it was not clear in the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT as to 
what the intention of the parties was in this matter, the tribunal ruled that this 
requirement was not met. The Plama Tribunal also presented a sceptical view of 
arguments based on the principle of expressio unius by stating that it: 
 
…shows that in NAFTA and probably in the FTAA the incorporation by 
reference of the dispute settlement provisions set forth in other BITs is 
explicitly excluded. Yet, if such language is lacking in an MFN provision, one 
cannot reason a contrario that the dispute resolution provisions must be 
deemed to be incorporated. The specific exclusion in the draft FTAA is the 
result of a reaction by States to the expansive interpretation made in the 
Maffezini case. That interpretation went beyond what State Parties to BITs 
generally intended to achieve by an MFN provision in a bilateral or 
multilateral invest- ment treaty.140 
 
However the tribunal reasoned that even though the expressio unius principle may not 
apply, there is still a natural division between substantive rights and procedural rights, 
which might restrict the extension of the MFN standard into dispute settlement 
provisions. 
 
Dispute resolution provisions in a specific treaty have been negotiated with a 
view to resolving disputes under that treaty. Contracting states cannot be 
presumed to have agreed that those provisions can be enlarged by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Idem. Paragraph 193. 
138 Idem. Paragraph 198. 
139 Idem. Paragraph 200. 
140 Idem. Paragraph 203.	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incorporating dispute resolution provisions from other treaties negotiated in 
an entirely different context.141 
  
From this quote it seems also that the tribunal shared the view with many other ICSID 
tribunals that there are specially negotiated provisions in a treaty that can not be 
affected by the use of an MFN clause. 
 
Based on this it would also seem that the tribunal did not agree with the decision of 
the Maffezini tribunal. However, the Plama tribunal agreed with the Maffezini court 
in that there is a need to make a distinction between a legitimate extension of rights 
and benefits through the operation of the MFN clause and disruptive treaty-shopping 
that would be disastrous for policy objectives reflected in specific treaty provisions.142 
 
The tribunal went further in this rationale and stated that instead of having many 
exceptions to the extension of the MFN standard there should only be one, mainly: 
 
an MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate by reference dispute 
settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the 
MFN provision in the basic treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting 
Parties intended to incorporate them.143 
 
The tribunal sympathized with the Maffezini court; in that the circumstances were 
unique and unprecedented, but clarified that because of this uniqueness the exceptions 
stated in Maffezini should not be treated as a statement of general principle guiding 
future tribunals in other cases where these special circumstances are not present.144 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Idem. Paragraph 207. 
142 Idem. Paragraph 222-223. 
143 Idem. Paragraph 223. 
144 Idem. Paragraph 224.	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3.3.3. Wintershall v. Argentine145 
Wintershall v. Argentine differs itself to the ruling in Siemens v. Argentina. In this 
case the claimant also sought to override a local remedies requirement before 
applying for arbitration, just as in Maffezini. However, the Tribunal in Wintershall 
concluded that unless clearly stated, the MFN clause did not apply to the treaty’s 
dispute settlement provisions. In support of its decision the following arguments were 
made.  
 
Firstly, the Tribunal argued that procedural provisions of a treaty were considered an 
offer made by the state concerning dispute resolution, which the investor is not forced 
to accept. If the investor decides to accept the offer, this acceptance can only be made 
for the entire agreement and not just individual elements. Since the local remedies 
requirement constituted a key component of the offer, it could not be bypassed.146 
 
[The local remedies requirement] becomes a condition of Argentina’s 
“consent” – which is, in effect, Argentina’s “offer” to arbitrate disputes under 
the BIT, but only upon acceptance and compliance by an investor of the 
provisions inter alia of Article 10(2); an investor (like the Claimant) can 
accept the “offer” only as so conditioned.147  
 
Secondly, the argument was made, much like in Plama, that the state’s consent to 
resolve a specific dispute through arbitration must be explicit and could therefore not 
be inferred. The Tribunal concluded that this requirement is not met if the MFN 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, 
December 8, 2008. 
146 Idem. Paragraph 160. 
147 Idem. Paragraph 116.	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clause does not ‘unequivocally’ mention procedural provisions.148 There is a 
distinction between making use of the best treatment provided for in another treaty 
and relying on an MFN clause in order to avoid procedural requirement, if this action 
was not explicitly provided for in the basic treaty.149 
 
Thirdly the tribunal referred to the third exception specified in the Maffezini verdict, 
stating that an investor cannot, on the basis of an MFN clause, demand to refer a 
dispute to a forum that is different than that provided for in the basic treaty.150 
Therefore the tribunal reasoned that replacing a jurisdiction provisions contained in 
the Germany-Argentina treaty with a provision in the USA-Argentina treaty 
specifying other dispute resolution for a was inadmissible.151  
 
Fourthly, the tribunal seemed to uphold the expressio unius principle, when stating 
that the MFN clause was to be applied solely to the issues listed in the clause, and as a 
jurisdiction provision was absent therein, the MFN clause was not applicable to 
dispute settlement.152 
 
3.3.4. Conclusion 
To conclude the Maffezini interpretation does not stand unchallenged. Many of the 
Tribunal in these cases have taken restrictive views on the scope of the MFN standard 
and stated general comments as to how the scope should be interpreted. It would seem 
that the arguments presented here are in conflict with the tribunals concurring with the 
Maffezini interpretation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Idem. 
149 Idem. Paragraph 168.	  
150 Idem. Paragraph 173. 
151 Idem. Paragraph 174. 
152 Idem. Paragraph 163-164.	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However, recently it has been suggested that this is an illusion. Looking at the cases 
Plama v. Bulgaria and Maffezini v. Argentine it would appear that they conflict. The 
Maffezini cases says that an MFN clause can be applied to overcome waiting periods 
and similar admissibility requirements.153 In the Plama case the Tribunal stated that an 
MFN clause does not extend to dispute settlement provisions, except when the 
contracting parties have expressed a contrary interest. From this it has been suggested 
that a rule has emerged stating that an MFN clause can be used to overcome waiting 
periods and similar admissibility requirements, but not replace, in whole or in part, 
the dispute resolution mechanism provided in the treaty from which jurisdiction is 
based.154 However as will be explained in chapter 4 this does not seem like a plaused 
assumption since this would bypass state parties consent to arbitration. In the 
following chapter the conflicting arguments seen in chapter 3 will be analysed in 
order to shed some light to the merits of them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB 97/7, 25 January 2000. (2002) 5 ICSID Rep. Paragraph 63. 
154 Kaufmann-Kohler, Gabrielle; 2006; Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?; page 371.	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 Chapter 4 
Conflicting Arguments  
 
From the background chapter it seems that there are many conflicting arguments as to 
the real scope of the MFN standard. As noted by the UNCTAD: 
 
…There are strong arguments both for and against applying the MFN clause 
to dispute settlement. In the end, this issue may need further clarification by 
international investment jurisprudence. 155 
 
However, the jurisprudence concerning the application of the MFN clause to dispute 
settlement is not consistent,156 and it might not be sure that a harmonization of this 
matter will be done quickly. In the subchapters below, the principal arguments will be 
analysed in order to attempt a clearification on the merits of them under international 
law. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1995-2006: TRENDS IN INVESTMENT 
RULEMAKING, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2006/5, UN Pub. New-York, Geneva, 2007; page 42. 
156 Rodriguez, Alejandro Faya; 2008; The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in International Investment 
Agreements: A Tool forTreaty Shopping?; Page 101 
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4.1. Distinction Between Substantive and Procedural Matters 
In RosInvest v. Russia the Respondent put forward the argument that there is a 
distinction between substantive and procedural matters in international contracts.157 
Therefore provisions that regulate substantive matters cannot be seen as similar to 
matters of procedural law. The argument is based on the idea that substantive 
questions are of a different legal nature than procedural questions. This means that the 
ejusdem generis principle prevents the two to be compared, thereby excluding MFN 
clauses referring to treatment to be applied to dispute settlement procedure.  
 
“In the absence of language or context to suggest the contrary, the ordinary 
meaning of investment shall be accorded treatment no less favourable that 
that accorded to investments made by investors of any third state is that the 
investors substantive rights in respect of the investments are to be treated no 
less favourably than under a BIT between the host State and a third State, and 
there is no warrant for construing the above phrase as importing procedural 
rights as well”158 
 
This argument seems to be derived from the principle of severability of arbitration 
clauses in private international law, connoting that such clauses are of a different and 
separate legal quality than other obligations of a contract.159 This principle is 
represented in Rome II.160 Another example such division is found in the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In it, there is no 
possibility to make a reservation against a substantive obligation, such action would 
defeat the object and purpose of the convention. However there is a possibility to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 RosInvestCo UK Ltd. V. The Russian Federation (award on Jurisdiction), Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, October, 2007. Paragraph  Paragraph 88. 
158 Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, 
Award, 13 September 2006, paragraph 92. 
159 Stern, Brigitte; 2011; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17); 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion; page 8. 
160 Rome II Article 1 Paragraph 3. 
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make a reservation against the jurisdiction of the ICJ to decide on the responsibility of 
states for the violation of a substantive rule under article 9.161 
 
Never the less, even though this approach has been given emphasis in some rewards, 
there seem to be little authority upholding such division.162 Arguing that MFN clauses 
should not apply to dispute settlement mechanisms in general by just distinguish 
between substantive aspects and procedural aspects seems not completely 
satisfactory. 
 
The tribunal in Renta v. Russia explained this predicament quite well: 
“It may be that some international lawyers reflexively adopt the dichotomy of 
primary/secondary obligations made familiar by the international law 
commission. This might explain the temptation to consider “treatment” a 
matter of primary or substantive rules and thus distict from “secondary” rules 
– such as remedies – in the event of a breach. …There is no authority for the 
proposition that MFN is limited to “primary” rules. The established proper 
criterion is rather ejusdem generis.”163 
 
Moreover, it is recognized in several decisions that availability of arbitration is one of 
the more important parts of the “treatment” a foreign investor is looking for. Access 
to arbitration has been considered a jurisdictional protection “inextricably related”164 
to substantive treatment165, “part of the treatment of foreign investors and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Idem. Page 9. 
162 Idem. Page 8. 
163 Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. V. Russian Federation, SCC No. 24/2007, Award on Preliminary Objection, 
20 March 2009. Paragraph 99-100. 
164 Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB 97/7, 25 January 2000. (2002) 5 ICSID Rep. Paragraph 54. 
165 Stern, Brigitte; 2011; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17); 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion; page 9.	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investments”166, “an integral part of the investment protection regime” or in itself “a 
substantive protection”.167 As the Maffezini Tribunal reasoned “…dispute settlement 
arrangements … [are] closely linked to material aspects of the treatment accorded.”168 
 
However, awards favouring the extension of dispute settlement provisions by an MFN 
clause, based on the comparability of substantive and procedural rights, have in most 
cases founded this conclusion on the jurisprudence from the Ambatielos claim.169 
Among the literature, it is disputed whether this case is a relevant reference.  
 
In Ambatielos, The Commission of Arbitration affirmed that there is no general 
principle preventing an MFN clause from being applied to matters relating to the 
‘administration of justice’170. However in the context of the case the administration of 
justice was a procedural obligation to provide foreign nationals with ‘free access’ to 
the national courts of each contracting state.171 The MFN clause in the treaty was 
invoked to found a claim of denial of justice for prejudice in the English courts. The 
MFN clause was not invoked in respect of the jurisdiction of the international 
tribunal.172 “The jurisdiction of the Commission of Arbitration was simply not in 
issue”173 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 3 
August 2004. Paragraph 102. 
167 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, Separate Opinion of 
Arbitrator Pedro Nikken. Paragraph 57. 
168 Gas Natural SDG, S.A: v. The Argentine Republic (Decision of the Tribunal on the Preliminary 
Questions of Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, 17 June 2005. Paragraph 31.	  
169 The Ambatielos Claim (Greece v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Award, 
Mar. 6, 1956, UNRIAA, Vol. XII. 
170 Idem. Page 109. 
 
171 Douglas, Zachary; 2010; The MFN Clause in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation 
off The Rails; page 102. 
172 Idem.  
173 Idem. 
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This has been underscored by the tribunal in Salini v. Jordan, which stated that: 
”The Tribunal will observe that in this case, Greece invoked the most- 
favored-nation clause with a view to securing, for one of its nationals, not the 
application of a dispute settlement clause, but the application of substantive 
provisions in treaties between the United Kingdom and several other countries 
under which their nationals were to be treated “in accordance with “justice,” 
“right” and “equity.” The solution adopted by the Arbitration Commission 
cannot therefore be directly transposed in this specific instance.”174  
 
The Tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria took the same standpoint and maintained that the 
Ambatielos “ruling relates to provisions concerning substantive protection in the 
sense of denial of justice in the domestic courts. It does not relate to the import of 
dispute resolution provisions of another treaty into the basic treaty.”175  
 
Therefore it seems that the assimilation of substantive and procedural provisions in 
Maffezini v. Spain and later concurring awards, based on the findings in Ambatielos 
is not reliable. However, the question still remains: if the term ‘treatment’ is in itself 
wide enough to be applicable to procedural matters such as dispute settlement, which 
seems to be a perception by many tribunals, can substantive and procedural provisions 
still be considered to be incomparable in the application of the principle of ejusdem 
generis principle? 
 
Maybe an approach to answer this question is found in RosInvest v. Russia. In that 
case the Tribunal asked whether the term ‘treatment’ included the protection by an 
arbitration clause. The Tribunal found that while protection by an arbitration clause 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Decision on 
Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, 29 November 2004. Paragraph 112. 
175 Plama Consortium Ltd v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case ARB/03/24, Decision on jurisdiction, 8 
February 2005. Paragraph 215. 
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was a highly relevant aspect of treatment, it does not directly affect investments.176 
The Tribunal further stipulated that the interpretation in regards to investors is 
inverted, stressing on the other hand that this interpretation only applied to 
unspecified MFN clauses and that enumerations of investor’s situations in an MFN 
clause rendered the dispute settlement mechanism absent.177 
 
This means that in the Tribunals view, when an MFN clause only refers to 
investments it should not cover dispute settlement mechanisms, because procedural 
rights can only benefit investors. However, this distinction was rejected in Siemens v. 
Argentine, which stated that: 
 
“For purpose of applying the MFN clause, there is no special significance to 
the differential use of the term investors or investments in the treaty… 
[since]… treatment of the investment includes treatment of the investors.”178 
 
The Tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria concurred and asserted that it did “…not attach a 
particular significance to the use if the different terms”179 This is also the view of the 
ILC which made no substantive distinction between the two in its draft articles.180 
This seems to point towards the assumption that such distinction is irrelevant from a 
legal standpoint. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 RosInvestCo UK Ltd. V. The Russian Federation (award on Jurisdiction), Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, October, 2007. Paragraph 128. 
177 Stern, Brigitte; 2011; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17); 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion. Paragraph 41. 
178 Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 3 
August 2004. Paragraph 92. 
179 Plama Consortium Ltd v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case ARB/03/24, Decision on jurisdiction, 8 
February 2005. Paragraph 190. 
180 International Law Commission; 1978; Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses with 
Commentaries; article 5.	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4.2. Distinction Between Objective and Teleological 
Interpretation 
In the cases summarised above there is one striking feature that is present in all of 
them. The parties’ intention concerning the MFN clause applicability to dispute 
settlement provision is not specifically stated or clearly determined. However in many 
BIT’s this is not the case. Taking the UK Model BIT as an example, the MFN clause 
found under article 3(3) states that: 
 
For avoidance of doubt MFN treatment shall apply to certain specified 
provisions of the BIT including the dispute settlement provision.181 
 
Other states have taking the opposite position such as the Free Trade of the Americas 
draft explicitly stating that: 
 
The parties note the recent decision of the arbitral tribunal in the Maffezini 
(Arg.) v. Kingdom of Spain, which found an unusually broad most favoured 
nation clause in an Argentina-Spain agreement to encompass international 
dispute resolution procedures. … By contrast, the Most-Favoured-Nation 
Article of this Agreement is expressly limited in its scope to matters “with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments” The Parties share the 
understanding and intent that this clause does not encompass international 
dispute resolution mechanisms…182 
 
Another example is found in the Norweigan Model BIT which points out that the 
MFN clause: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Dolzer, Rudolf, Schreuer Christoph; 2008; Principles of International Investment Law; page 378. 
182 Free Trade of the Americas draft of 21 November 2003, footnote 13. 
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…does not encompass dispute resolution mechanisms provided for in this 
Agreement or other International Agreements.183 
 
Due to the lack of these explicit provisions in the above-mentioned cases there is a 
need to interpret the meaning and scope of the MFN clause. As the cases stand 
testament to, this interpretation is difficult. To quote Richard Gardiner, “treaty 
interpretation is an art.”184 This means that there is no universal tool for interpretation, 
only guidelines. To aid in such effort the International Law Commission created the 
draft articles on MFN in 1978. However, the draft articles provide limited guidance 
on the question of the application of the MFN standard in investment law. Under draft 
article 9, a beneficiary State acquires only those rights, which fall within the subject 
matter of the MFN clause. However determining the subject matter is the question 
that often breaks the line of the application of the standard. 
 
In order to find the meaning of a treaty, the interpreter has to find the terms of the 
treaty, the context of those terms, and the object and purpose of the treaty. The 
Vienna Convention defines context as “any agreement relating to the treaty which 
was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty”185 as 
well as “any instrument made by one or more parties…and accepted by the other 
parties…” Furthermore, the interpreter has to take into account any relevant 
subsequent agreement and practice of the parties as well as relevant principles of 
international law.186 
 
Within traditional legal doctrinal criticism there is customary a distinction between 
teleogical, subjective and objective interpretation. These schools are all represented 
under article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. Therefore 	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185 VCLT Article 31(2). 
186 VCLT Article 31(3). 
	   57	  
from the perspective of VCLT there is no reason to criticize tribunals for relying on 
any of these schools when interpreting the scope of the MFN clause. Under article 42 
of the ICSID Convention, a tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with the 
rules that the parties of the dispute has agreed on. This general statement does not 
give the tribunals much guidance on how to approach interpretive issues. 
 	  
4.2.1. Objective Interpretation 
Looking at the ordinary meaning of the term in all matters governed by the present 
Agreement187 in the Maffezini MFN clause, the perception is that all of the matters 
that the BIT deals with are included and that the application is not restricted by 
limitations. This is the interpretation that the Maffezini made. The phrase all matters 
do not seem ambiguous. All matters would suggest that it does incorporate dispute 
settlement provisions. Still, when the tribunal in Wintershall was faced with the same 
expression it stated that: 
Even words like ‘all matters relating to [...]’ in an MFN clause may not be 
sufficient to extend such clause to the dispute resolution provisions of the 
BIT.188 
 
From an objective standpoint the actual wording used in an MFN treatment clause 
matters and a broad wording cannot be simply discarded by an arbitral tribunal. As 
supported by the VCLT the parties have the freedom to contract189 and the text of the 
treaty must be taken at its ”face value”.190  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB 97/7, 25 January 2000. (2002) 5 ICSID Rep. Paragraph 38. 
188 Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, 
December 8, 2008. Paragraph 186. 
189 VCLT Preamble, Paragraph 3. 
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Never the less, even though an objective interpretation would allow you to extend an 
MFN clause to dispute settlement, there is still an issue that many of the tribunal 
seemed to have missed to assess, namely if the treatment is more favourable. Surely 
one could make the assumption that having the choice to refer your case to arbitration 
is better than not having it referred and instead having to resort to domestic courts. 
Still, as seen in Wintershall: 
 
A less favourable provision in a basic treaty as compared to a provision in a 
third party treaty is not to be assumed or presumed. It must be proved.191  
 
Furthermore, considerations have to be made, which both the tribunals in Maffezini 
and Plama pointed out, when an interpretation leads to a result, which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable.192 Under the Maffezini interpretation the conditioned consent 
to arbitration on an exhaustion of local remedies requirement, which is allowed under 
the ICSID Convention,193 could not be bypassed194. However a condition of local 
remedies during a certain time period could under the same interpretation be 
bypassed. It would seem that such interpretation would be categorized as absurd and 
unreasonable. As Zachary Douglas puts it: “The Maffezini decision represents a point 
of departure from the existing conception of the function of MFN clauses in 
international law.”195 
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4.2.2. Teleological Interpretation 
As previously stated above, from the perspective of VCLT there is no reason to 
criticize tribunals for relying on any of the three basic methods of interpretation, when 
interpreting the scope of the MFN clause. However, as Sir	  Ian	  Sinclair	  declares:	  
 
There can be no common intentions of the parties aside or apart from the text 
they have agreed upon.196 
 
Still, treaty interpretation does not take place in a vacuum.197 Strict textual 
interpretation as is problematic, especially in pluralistic legal systems. This is an 
observed fact in the legal order of the European Union (EU),198 where “…pluralism 
tends to increase the textual ambiguity of legal provisions and to enhance the potential 
for conflicting legal norms.”199 
 
In the context of the European Union, the plurality stems from the different official 
languages and legal traditions of the individual member states.200 This is in correlation 
to what international investment law also faces. Since the official languages of the 
European Union all carry the same legal value and the textual interpretation may 
produce different results depending on the linguistic version of a rule, a teleological 
interpretation is a more suitable form of guaranteeing a uniform application of EU 
law.201 A teleological approach may also create more value in the context of 
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jurisprudence, since it not only provides a specific legal outcome for the case at hand, 
but also offers a wider normative guidance or understanding for future cases.202 
 
Another relationship between international investment law and EU law is the 
normative pluralism, which creates textual ambiguity.203 What is meant by that is that 
agreements might be reached on the basis of different normative assumptions. Even 
though this criticises the results a textual analysis might result in, this criticism can 
equally be applied to a teleological approach. This was emphasised by the Plama 
Tribunal, which stated that: 
 
[The] risk that the placing of undue emphasis on the ‘object and purpose’ of a 
treaty will encourage teleological methods of interpretation [which], in some 
of its more extreme forms, will even deny the relevance of the intentions of the 
parties204  
 
Nothing is to say that a teleological approach in general will not give an ambiguous 
result, also in a pluralistic legal system. However, a teleological approach is still 
bound by legal reasoning and the limits imposed by the text, but are prevented from a 
textual manipulation of a legal rule, since a teleological interpretation looks for the 
goal of a provision.205 
 
The Advocate General of Court of Justice of the European Communities argued that 
when a court is investigating the meaning of an ambigous provision, the court must 
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February 2005. Paragraph 193. 
205 Idem. 
	   61	  
decide the case on what it perceive as the underlying normative foundation and that 
this is the only way these questions could be legally solved.206 To put it to the point: 
 
In the context of ambiguous or conflicting provisions, telos signifies an higher 
constrain than pure reference to wording or intent. It binds courts to a 
consistent normative reading of those provisions.207 
 
Within treaty interpretation one can distinguish between an effective interpretation 
and a restrictive interpretation. An effective interpretation can be associated with a 
teleological approach since an effective interpretation looks for the understanding that 
would fulfil the objectives of a provision or a treaty.208 In contrast a restrictive 
interpretation favours the interpretation the best protects the sovereignty of the parties 
to a treaty.209 In the case Berschader v. Russia the Tribunal reasoned whether a 
restrictive or an effective interpretation would provide the most accurate outcome and 
stated that: 
	  
“…while it may be true that no general principle exists, according to which 
arbitration agreements should be construed restrictively, particular care 
should nevertheless be exercised in ascertaining the intentions of the parties 
with regard to an arbitration agreement which is to be reached by 
incorporation by reference in an MFN clause” 210 
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When exploring the goal of the MFN standard, the argument can be made that the 
MFN standard is an explicit obligation with an explicit scope. As stated above it 
seems that this statement is supported in the ILC’s draft articles as well as many 
Tribunals. From article 31:4 of VCLT: 
A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended.211 
As affirmed by the Tribunal in Berschader,	  “the expression ‘all matters covered by 
the present Treaty’ certainly cannot be understood literally.”212 In Tecmed,	   the	  tribunal	   declared	   that	   matters relating to “the access of foreign investor to the 
substantive provisions ...	  cannot ... be impaired by the principle contained in the most 
favored nation clause.”213 From this it would seem that a teleological method of 
interpretation would provide a better instrument for the investigation of the special 
meaning and scope of the MFN standard.  
 
Within the reach of this thesis, two different contentions can be made from a 
teleological interpretation of the MFN standard and its applicability to procedural 
provisions. Firstly, the argument can be made that there is a distinction between 
procedural law and substantive law, based on the argument that there is a distinction 
between rights and fundamental conditions for access to the rights under international 
law. Secondly, the argument can be made that the jurisprudence from international 
trade law, suggests that the intention of the MFN standard is only to afford more 
favourable treatment if there is a material disadvantage from not being extended the 
same treatment. These contentions will be discussed in chapter 4.4.2. 
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4.3. Consideration Regarding Specially Negotiated Provisions 
Does the MFN rule alter arrangements specifically made by the parties? This was the 
question that the Tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria contemplated. The argument was 
made that the MFN clause was a specially negotiated provision and therefore could 
not be fit for an extensive interpretation. The Tribunal laid great emphasis on this. 
The rationale behind the argument is the idea that there are some matters in a contract 
that are more important to the parties than other such as dispute resolution provisions, 
and that there is a ‘giving and taking’ situation taking part during the negotiations of 
the contract. The end results, being an agreement of the terms, are therefore a result of 
weighing and balancing these special provisions until an agreeable equilibrium is 
reached. By interpreting the MFN clause extensively, the argument is made that this 
equilibrium is disturb, thereby acting against the wishes and intentions of the parties. 
This was one of the main principles that the Maffezini tribunal set out in its award. 
 
As a matter of principle, the beneficiary of the clause should not be able to 
override public policy considerations that the contracting parties might have 
envisaged as fundamental conditions for their acceptance of the agreement in 
question, particularly if the beneficiary is a private investor, as is often the 
case.214  
 
This statement was affirmed in Tecmed v. Mexico. In that case, the Tribunal reasoned 
that there are provisions in a treaty, which have a decisive role in the acceptance of a 
treaty. These provisions should be seen as specially negotiated by the contracting 
parties. Altering or replacing these provisons through the MFN clause would affect 
the ‘general equilibrium’ of the treaty, and would manifest contrary to the intention of 
the parties.215 
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However, while this argument seems plausible, it lacks several important aspects for 
it to endure serious empirical scrutiny. First of all, such logic presents severe 
interpretative difficulties, such as how to deduce which provisions of a contract that 
actually holds this status. In the cases summarized, the MFN clauses have all been 
generally or vaguely formulated, whereby the main difficulty has been to interpret the 
wishes and intentions of the parties. While many of the Tribunals have stated that 
there is a need to establish the ‘true intention of the parties’, the approach these 
Tribunal have taken to ascertain this intention seems mixed and subjective.216 The 
problem becomes even more complex, when reasoning as to whether the parties at the 
time of the agreement to the terms had foreseen the question of the expansion of 
jurisdiction through the invocation of the MFN clause. Therefore this argument holds 
little scrutiny when arguing that dispute resolution provisions are more important than 
other matters of a contract since such ideas have not been explicated in any of the 
case analysed for this paper. 
 
Secondly, the custom of Model BIT indicates that there is not any extensive 
negotiation taking place when forming a BIT.217 As Christoph Schreuer testified in 
Wintershall v. Argentine:  
 
[BIT’s]are very often not negotiated at all, they are just being put on the table, and I 
have heard several representatives who have actually been active in this Treaty-
making process, if you can call it that, say that, ‘We had no idea that this would have 
real consequences in the real world’.”218 
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Thirdly, State parties intend to write what they write. What is meant by that is that 
states are doubtfully careless when incorporating international arbitration mechanisms 
and negotiating the scope of them. The principle of interdependency of provisions 
within a treaty219, would suggest that there is no normative hierarchy within a 
treaty.220 Therefore if would seem that the negotiations prior to arriving at an agreed 
text does not affect the legal significance of each clause. This was further affirmed by 
the Siemens v. Argentine tribunal.221 
 
4.3.1. Considerations Regarding State’s Consent to Arbitration 
Even though the general argument concerning specially negotiated provisions seems 
implausible from a legal standpoint, one aspect of this argument needs to be 
addressed, namely a states consent to arbitration.  
 
Under article 25, paragraph 1 of the ICSID convention the parties need to consent to 
arbitration in order for the arbitration tribunal to have jurisdiction to decide the 
dispute. This originates in the principle of ratione voluntatis. It is one of the four 
cornerstones222 of assessing jurisdiction in international law and states that a 
contracting party must consent to a jurisdiction.223 In international law there is not 
inherent locus standi droit.224 This means that no actor on has an innate right to access 
dispute settlement recourse on the international level.  	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The ICJ in Portugal v. Austria recognized this principle in the case concerning East 
Timor where it stated that: “the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of 
consent to jurisdiction are two different things”225 A few years later the ICJ clarified 
this statement in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Rwanda 
 
The Court observes, however, as it has already had occasion to emphasize, 
that “the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to 
jurisdiction are two different things” (East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29), and that the mere fact that 
rights and obligations erga omnes may be at issue in a dispute would not give 
the Court jurisdiction to entertain that dispute. The same applies to the 
relationship between peremptory norms of general international law (jus 
cogens) and the establishment of the Court’s jurisdiction: the fact that a 
dispute relates to compliance with a norm having such a character, which is 
assuredly the case with regard to the prohibition of genocide, cannot of itself 
provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain that dispute. 
Under the Court’s Statute that jurisdiction is always based on the consent of 
the parties.226 
 
Within ICSID arbitration this consent may be expressed broadly or restrictively such 
as incorporating conditions of exhaustion of local remedies or waiting periods, and 
allowing for all claim or certain claims.227 This means that consent is given under 
certain conditions. This view is represented in the commentaries to the Draft Articles 
on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, which state that:  
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The essence of the rule is that the beneficiary of a most-favoured-nation 
clause cannot claim from the granting State advantages of a kind other than 
that stipulated in the clause. For instance, if the most- favoured nation clause 
promises most-favoured-nation treatment solely for fish, such treatment 
cannot be claimed under the same clause for meat.228 
 
However, even though consent to ICSID arbitration can be expressed broadly or 
restrictively the tribunal in Plama v. Argentine reasoned that if the qualifying 
conditions expressed by the state for it to give its consent, are not fulfilled there is no 
consent.229 To quote Arbitrator Brigitte Stern: 
 
An MFN clause cannot enlarge the scope of the basic treaty’s right to 
international arbitration, it cannot be used to grant access to international 
arbitration when this is not possible under the conditions provided for in the 
basic treaty.230  
 
When the tribunal in Wintershall v. Argentine was present by the question if MFN 
treatment could be applied to dispute settlement provisions in order to bypass an 18-
month local remedies requirement, they declared that it could not.231 It argued that 
even though the word ‘treatment’ possibly could involve protection of an investment 
be the investor through ICSID arbitration, the primary concern was whether this 
requirement was part of Argentina’s offer for ICSID arbitration.232 The tribunal 	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concluded that it was and that this offer must be accepted by the investor with the 
terms intact.233 It stated that the principle of state consent was a fundamental principle 
of international law and as such state consent could not be presumed.234 This was 
further layed down in the Lotus case in which the tribunal stated that a presumed 
consent would not be regarded as sufficient because any restriction upon the 
independence of a state not previously agreed to cannot be presumed by the courts.235 
 
It would seem that a jurisdictional clause is often a complex arrangement, with 
various requirements and interests being contemplated and balanced. As underscored 
by the legal doctrinal literature: 
 
...It is essential when applying an MFN clause to be satisfied that the 
provisions relied upon as constituting more favourable treatment in the other 
treaty are properly applicable, and will not have the effect of fundamentally 
subverting the carefully negotiated balance of the BIT in question. It is 
submitted that this is precisely the effect of the heretical decision of the 
Tribunal on objections to jurisdiction in Maffezini v Spain.  
... 
It is not to be presumed that this can be disrupted by an investor selecting at 
will from an assorted menu of other options provided in other treaties, 
negotiated with other State parties and in other circumstances. 236 
 
Therefore it would seem that extending the scope of the MFN clause into dispute 
settlement provisions would offset this complex arrangement and produce an award 
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234 Idem. 160(3). 
235 Permanent Court of International Justice; The Case of the S.S. ”Lotus” (France v. Turkey), Series A, 
No. 10 (1927), Paragraph 18.	  
236 Stern, Brigitte; 2011; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17); 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion; Paragraph 107. 
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that constitutes an unreasonable result. Under VCLT article 32(b) it appears that such 
interpretation would violate international law. 
 
4.3.2. Consideration Regarding Legal Certainty  
One of the profound concerns listed in the Maffezini award to the extension of the 
MFN clause into dispute settlement provisions was the risk of treaty shopping. In the 
decision in Siemens v. Argentine the tribunal rejected the respondents argument that, 
if the claimant was entitled to import the advantageous aspects of the dispute 
resolution provisions of the Argentine-Chile BIT, then it should be required to import 
the disadvantageous aspects of those provisions as well. In that case the 
disadvantageous provisions included a ‘fork-in-the-road’ provision, which was absent 
in the basic treaty. The tribunal reasoned that even though the disadvantages may 
have been a trade-off for the claimed advantages, an MFN clause could only attract 
more favourable treatment. This means that the more favourable jurisdictional clause 
as a whole will not be incorporated in the basic treaty, but an investor can pick and 
choose aspects of a jurisdictional clause, which appears more favourable.237 It appears 
that this decision opened the door for an investor to combine different dispute 
resolutions to suit the individual circumstances of each case. What this means is that 
the legal predictability to know what obligations a party takes on when signing a BIT 
with an MFN clause could be greatly reduced. 
 
 
Add to this the conflicting arbitral decisions, with different awards being rendered for 
some times very like factual circumstances238, the legal predictability that would be 
required in international business transaction appears seriously threatened.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Stephen Fietta, Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution under Bilateral Investment 
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238 Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, 
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From the ILC it can be denoted that how an interpreter approaches an MFN clause 
will depend in part on how the interpreter views the nature of MFN clauses. If MFN 
clauses are seen as having the objective of promoting non-discrimination and 
harmonization, then a treaty interpreter may consider that the very purpose of the 
clause is to permit and indeed encourage treaty shopping. An interpreter, who sees an 
MFN clause as having the economic purpose of allowing competition to proceed on 
the basis of equality of opportunity, might be more inclined to favour a 
substantive/procedural distinction in the interpretation of an MFN provision.239 
 
Under the ICSID system there is no mechanism for promoting certainty and 
predictability.240 Still, past decisions are cited by parties and even though tribunals are 
not bound by these decisions241, many use them as guidance when analysing legal 
questions. However, even though it would be hard to argue that any dispute settlement 
does not involve risk and there is always an element of uncertainty in an answer to a 
legal question, the central question one might as is whether arbitration is risky for the 
parties?  
 
Frank Spoorenberg and Jorge E. Viñuales suggest that the risk might be associated 
with what the parties of an IIA expect from international arbitration. The main 
utilizers of international arbitration do not value legal certainty and predictability as 
much as other aspects that this form of dispute settlement has to offer. As 
Spoorenberg and Viñuales puts it: 
 
The main users of international arbitration proceedings may not be willing to 
enhance legal certainty and the predictability of the procedures’ outcomes if 
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that considerably impairs the confidentiality, flexibility and expediency which 
the international arbitration system is expected to provide.242 
 
Today there are different techniques to counteract an unwanted arbitration decision 
such as annulment proceedings under article 52 of ICSID or challenges under 
domestic law to name a few.243  
Never the less, even though legal certainty appears not to be valued higher than other 
aspects of international arbitration, it can not be a desirable situation to not be able to 
predict your legal obligations when incorporating an MFN clause in your BIT. With 
the formation of the New York Convention, an arbitral award has basically become 
universally enforced. Adding to this the continued development of BIT agreements 
between nations, it could be perceived that the core values for using international 
arbitration would change. 
 
However, in a discussion paper presented by the ICSID Secretariat in 2004 the 
institution stated that one of its goals is to foster coherence and consistency in its case 
law.244 As stated in M.C.I. v. Ecuador: 
 
The responsibility for ensuring consistency in the jurisprudence and for 
building a coherent body of law rests primarily with the investment 
tribunals.245 
 
In the end consistency in international arbitration awards is important in two aspects. 
Firstly, it is argued that a rule of law is only a rule of law if it is consistently applied 	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244 ICSID; 2004; POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR ICSID 
ARBITRATION; Paragraph 21. 
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in order to be predictable.246 This might not be a plausible assumption in international 
arbitration law though, since the very structure of arbitration tribunal is ad hoc, 
meaning that the tribunal itself is only formed to del with one particular case. A 
second argument that seems to stand more ground is of a political nature. 
Inconsistency in arbitration awards creates uncertainty and damages legitimate 
expectations of investors and states.247 Investors might find that the structures they 
have made to their investment in a manner to take advantage of coverage’s afforded 
under investment treaties, does not suddenly provide the expected benefits. In the 
same manner, might states find themselves in a position to explain to taxpayers why 
they are subject to damage awards for several hundreds of million of dollars in one 
case, but not in another.248 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion  
 
To conclude it is hard to give a general statement as to how far the extent of the MFN 
standard reaches in international investment agreements. The cases analysed in this 
thesis demonstrate the difficulty to ascertain the true intention of the parties. Partly 
the reasons for the inconclusiveness are mainly rooted into the division of right where 
on one hand the parties have a freedom to contract which means the parties are free to 
draft and contract MFN clauses in almost endless ways. On the other hand there are 
principles of international law that cannot be ignored and that may conflict with this 
freedom. 
 
The sources available however are inconclusive. The ILC’s draft articles on the MFN 
standard were written before the problem of the application of the standard to dispute 
settlement provisions presented.  
 
The provisions in bilateral investment treaties are not uniform both concerning the 
substantive protection of investors and investors’ possibilities to settle disputes with 
the host state. The large number of treaties with varying substantive and procedural 
standards has created a particular challenge to the question of the scope of MFN 
clauses. Especially the applicability of MFN clauses to dispute settlement 
mechanisms has recently given rise to interpretative problems since the diversity of 
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provisions concerning dispute settlement conflicts with the MFN principle, which 
generally requires that all investors be treated equally. 
 
As mentioned earlier, legal interpretation is not an exact science. This might seem 
obvious but it reflects that the diverging outcomes witnessed in this thesis could not 
be a systematic error but only a diverging interpretation. However in this thesis I have 
an analogy to how the MFN standard is interpreted in international trade law in order 
to see if it is reasonable to expect an MFN clause to be interpreted as liberal as to 
extend to dispute settlement provisions. It would seem that it is not if the clause does 
not explicitly state that it in fact does extend to dispute settlement provisions as in the 
case of the United Kingdom model BIT. An analogy suggests that, even though the 
intensions of the parties might be interpreted to have the MFN standard to extend to 
dispute settlement provisions, it is not reasonable to expect this. The reasons for this 
are firstly, that an extension would violate a state party’s consent to arbitration. 
Secondly, within international trade law, there exists a separation between substantive 
and procedural provisions, which seems to form a norm that the MFN standard only 
applies to substantive matters. Thirdly, a two-tier comparison must be successful in 
order for a violation of MFN treatment to occur. This means that the mere fact of a 
difference in treatment does not seem to be enough in order for a violation to occur. 
Instead the difference in treatment must result in a competitative disadvantage for a 
breach of the MFN standard to occur. 
 
In the beginning of this paper I set out four research questions, namely: 
• Can the standard of Most-Favoured-Nation treatment be applied to 
international investment arbitration procedural provisions? 
The jurisprudence partly shows that it can be extended to procedural provisions. It is 
however far from conclusive. In the cases where this has been possible an objective 
interpretation of the individual clause seems to have been the method for reaching 
such a result. In the cases where it has not been possible to extend the MFN clause to 
dispute settlement provisions a teleological interpretation seems to have been the 
main guiding tool. However a more important question dealt with in this thesis is: 
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• Does an extension to procedural provisions defeat the object and purpose of 
the MFN standard? 
This question is of course very much connected to the first question The analysis of 
this paper argues that an extension does not seem to conclusively suggest that it does 
defeat the object and purpose of the MFN standard since the purpose of the standard 
seems to be to prevent discrimination against foreign investors and since a difference 
in treatment, in regards to different dispute settlement provisions, might be a sign of 
discrimination between foreign investors, an mfn application to neutralize this might 
be within the object and purpose of the standard.  
 
However, a more important question rising out of the investigation of this question 
might instead be if it is reasonable for the parties to expect that an MFN clause does 
extend to dispute settlement provisions if it does not explicitly say so. An analogy to 
international trade law suggests that it is not reasonable to expect this. This position 
was affirmed in Plama v. Bulgaria for instance. 
 
• Where does the point of litigation truly lie according to the precedence? 
From the analysis of the jurisprudence this question is impossible to answer. However 
it has been suggested in analysis that it is possible to harmonize the conflicting 
outcomes. Never the less a harmonization of the conflicting awards does not seem 
plausible out of an international law perspective since it would seem that an extension 
to dispute settlement provisions even in minor adjustments as in Maffezini would 
constitute a violation of state’s sovereign right to consent to arbitration. 
 
• Should a tribunal use presentence to substantiate the point of litigation? 
Arbitration tribunals are under no obligation to do so. However an analysis of the 
reasoning of individual tribunals show that it is not irrelevant to do so and that the 
practice is there. However with the apparent conflicting outcomes it would seem that 
there are more merits using other sources of interpretation. 
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Can the precedence analysed in this paper tell us something? Are there any general 
statements to be made concerning the scope of application of the MFN standard? Well 
first of all, it would seem that BIT’s and IIA’s are not self-containing regimes. What I 
mean by this is that BIT’s and IIA’s are affected by various matters that are not found 
in the specific treaty. As an example, almost all the tribunals looked at other cases in 
order to interpret a provision in the specific treaty. 
 
In the context of predictability and article 32 of the Vienna Convention, a final remark 
is that the approach to the interpretation of the MFN standard taken by the Tribunal in 
Plama v. Bulgaria, seems like a fitting choice. As the tribunal stated, instead of the 
multiple exceptions to the extension of the MFN standard to procedural provisions, 
one single exception should stand.  
 
 
An MFN provision in a basic treaty should not incorporate by reference dispute 
settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the MFN 
provision in the basic treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to 
incorporate them. 
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